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Cyberspace Odyssey: A Competitive Team-Oriented
Serious Game in Computer Networking
Kendra Graham, James Anderson, Conrad Rife , Bryce Heitmeyer, Pranav R. Patel ,
Scott Nykl , Alan C. Lin, and Laurence D. Merkle
Abstract—Cyberspace odyssey (CSO) is a novel serious game
supporting computer networking education by engaging students in
a race to successfully perform various cybersecurity tasks in
order to collect clues and solve a puzzle in virtual near-Earth three-
dimensional space. Each team interacts with the game server
through a dedicated client presenting a multimodal interface, using
a game controller for navigation and various desktop computer
networking tools of the trade for cybersecurity tasks on the game’s
physical network. Specifically, teams connect to wireless access
points, use packet monitors to intercept network traffic, decrypt
and reverse engineer that traffic, craft well-formed and meaningful
responses, and transmit those responses. Successful completion of
these physical network actions to solve a sequence of increasingly
complex problems is necessary to progress through the virtual
story-driven adventure. Use of the networking tools reinforces
networking theory and offers hands-on practical training requisite
for today’s cyber operators. This article presents the learning
outcomes targeted by a classroom intervention based on CSO, the
design and implementation of the game, a pedagogical overview of
the overall intervention, and four years of quantitative and
qualitative data assessing its effectiveness.
Index Terms—Computer networking education, cyber education,
serious games.
I. INTRODUCTION
TRADITIONAL learning formats, such as textbooks andlectures, can organize and present material, but long-term
retention is improved when students internalize and apply
concepts. It is widely accepted that education can benefit from
more engaging instructional formats that facilitate motivation
and interaction and allow students to apply and practice what
they learn in controlled settings [1]–[3].
D€orner et al. [4] outline how the power of games extends
beyond pure entertainment. In contrast to play, which does not
necessarily have a purpose or explicit rules [5], games are rule
based and have specific goals or win/lose conditions. This aspect
of games enables them to serve clear educational purposes: stu-
dents can receive feedback on their progress toward the learning
objectives through a game’s reward system. Furthermore, in
contrast to traditional homework problems, game design focuses
on providing pleasant sensory experiences, i.e., fun. This gener-
ates interest and curiosity that translates into motivation and
active engagement, encouraging sustained learning. In particu-
lar, Graesser and Ottati [6] found that interactivity and narratives
within games promote sustained learning. In turn, the choices
made during a game uniquely create an emotional attachment
that promotes quicker comprehension and better retention. In
essence, there are few equivalent education tools that convey a
“spirit of play instead of work” [7].
Cyberspace odyssey (CSO) is a serious game (i.e., a game
in which the primary purpose is something other than enter-
tainment [8]) designed to exploit this opportunity, specifically
for the topic of computer network security. It allows students
to learn and practice computer network basics in the context
of a networked, multiplayer game that integrates real-world
components with an engaging three-dimensional (3-D) virtual
environment. Its design is heavily influenced by the target
audience and the learning outcomes (LOs). Other key design
features focus on encouraging competitiveness and fun
play [4], [9].
The following section places CSO within the context of rele-
vant prior research. This article then describes the game in relation
to its audience and the relevant LOs of the academic program of
which it is a part. It next discusses the system design and imple-
mentation, again in relation to the relevant LOs. This article con-
tinues by describing the overall intervention (pregame briefing,
reference materials, pregame orientation period, and gameplay)
and the assessment of its impact on student learning. The assess-
ment includes analysis of pretest and posttest responses, a student
survey at the end of the course, instructor observations, and quan-
titative score and game objective completion rates.
This article concludes by identifying game enhancements to
be included for future course offerings as part of a continuous
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improvement process. (The supplementary pages present the
pre/posttest instrument.)
II. RELATED WORK
A substantial and growing body of research explores the
ability of games to teach computer science concepts in an
engaging and effective way (see [7] for a recent review). How-
ever, a relatively small fraction of serious games intended for
computing education focus on cybersecurity, and only a hand-
ful of such games are aimed at information technology (IT)
professionals [10]. Notable examples include CyberCIEGE,
CounterMeasures, SecurityCom, CyberProtect, and HackNet.
CyberCIEGE [11] was developed for large-scale informa-
tion security training and awareness purposes by the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) and is available at no cost to gov-
ernment organizations and educational institutions. It is a
single-player graphical user interface (GUI)-based resource
management simulation game that places the user in charge of
information assurance decisions for an enterprise environ-
ment. Players attempt to protect information against attacks
while still making it accessible to those who require access.
The simulation is executed by an extensible game engine,
which provides functionality for developers to create different
scenarios for varied training purposes. The basic user scenario is
intended to educate information system users with respect to fun-
damental computer security topics, including information value,
access control mechanisms, social engineering, password man-
agement, malicious software, basic safe computing, safeguard-
ing data, and physical security mechanisms. The overall goal is
to improve their everyday cyber decision-making processes. The
second scenario developed by the NPS is intended for IT staff
and introduces them to “physical security mechanisms, access
control, filtering, antivirus protection, data backups, patching
configurations, password policies, and network vulnerability
assessment.” Scenarios developed by other researchers focus on
identity theft prevention and reducing the risks of distributing
worms and viruses. Chang and Chua later constructed a scenario
to teach network traffic analysis in the context of simulated trans-
mission control protocol (TCP) Internet protocol (IP) synchro-
nize flood and packet sniffing attacks using a custom analysis
tool integrated directly into the CyberCIEGE interface [12].
None of these scenarios employ real-world network traffic, use
ubiquitous traffic analysis tools, such as Wireshark [13], or
require network packet construction.
CounterMeasures [14], also a single-player simulation
game, styles itself as a more engaging and effective alternative
to traditional textbooks for learning security principles. Play-
ers are instructed in basic hacking techniques as they are given
objectives to accomplish in a sandboxed shell environment.
The game is implemented with a client–server architecture, in
which the client consists of a simple GUI, including a console
window. Players send commands through the GUI to the
server, which uses one virtual machine to execute those com-
mands, targeting the other virtual machine. The server then
sends the appropriate responses and helpful instructions to the
client for display in the GUI.
SecurityCom [15], which has similar training objectives to
CyberCIEGE, is simpler and designed for team-based infor-
mation security education. Gameplay in SecurityCom requires
players to negotiate and work with each other to make infor-
mation assurance decisions. Although players work in teams,
there does not seem to be support for multiple teams.
CyberProtect [16], sponsored by the Department of Defense,
was a 2010 finalist in the Serious Games Showcase and Chal-
lenge (SGS&C). To qualify as a serious game for SGS&C, a
game must clearly state measurable learning objectives, provide
players with a clearly identified problems, make use of gameplay
dynamics, and provide player feedback regarding progress
toward learning objectives [17]. CyberProtect puts the player in
the role of a network administrator for the purpose of learning
basic computer network defense and information assurance
resource management through a quarterly budget mechanism.
The game is still available at no charge and is the only entry cur-
rently listed under Defense Information Systems Agency Online
Training Catalog for Cybersecurity Simulations.
HackNet [18] was both a 2015 SGS&C finalist and a winner
of the 2015 Simulation Technology and Training Conference
held annually by Simulation Australasia. It lets the player
assume the role of an offensive hacker, using UNIX-like com-
mands and metasploit-like tools. The narrative encourages
ethical white-hat typical behavior, stepping the player through
progressively harder challenges that combine lessons learned
from previous missions.
The animations developed by Yuan et al. [19] to teach net-
work security concepts do not meet the definition of games, but
have enough game-like elements and teach concepts similar
enough to those taught by CSO to be relevant. These tools show
visualizations of several computer security concepts related to
networks, such as a packet sniffer, the Kerberos authentication
architecture, and demonstrations of wireless network attacks.
Each visual has several elements that allow the user to interact
with it, in ways such as entering their own data input or control-
ling the flow of the animation by skipping forward and back-
ward, pausing, or speeding up and slowing down the animation.
CSO distinguishes itself from these games in the way that it
integrates a virtual game world with a real-world networking
apparatus. CyberCIEGE does provide a virtual world and
motivating story, but the game is purely virtual and does not
teach the same networking concepts that CSO does. Security-
Com is similar to CyberCIEGE, but is simpler and designed
for teams rather than individuals. The visualization tools teach
some of the same things that CSO does, but do not provide
practice for the student. CounterMeasures could likely be con-
figured to teach the same principles as CSO, but the practice
would still come by way of a simulation, and each practice
exercise would still be an end unto itself, without an overarch-
ing motivational premise. CSO provides real-world practice in
packet capture and crafting, combined with a 3-D virtual
world to give context and motivation for the practice. Further-
more, CSO is multiplayer rather than single-player, requiring
team members to cooperate with each other while encouraging
competition between teams and thereby making the game
nondeterministic.
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CSO also distinguishes itself from many other serious
games aimed at facilitating computing concepts by avoiding
several pitfalls identified by the Innovation and Technology in
Computer Science Education 2016 working group [7].
1) CSO’s LOs are explicitly identified.
2) These LOs are in the networking domain rather than an
introductory computer science domain.
3) CSO has been in practical use for four years, and it is
anticipated to be for the foreseeable future.
4) CSO is one part of an intervention, the efficacy of
which in facilitating its LOs has been evaluated each
year, and those evaluations are used to enable con-
tinued improvements.
III. CONTEXT OF THE CSO GAME AND INTERVENTION
A. Understand the Audience
CSO is used in the Advanced Cyber Education (ACE) pro-
gram, a four-week leadership training course teaching cyberse-
curity principles. ACE is offered each summer by the Center
for Cyberspace Research at the Air Force Institute of Technol-
ogy (AFIT). It is open to selected cadets of the Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC) programs and service academies of the
United States. They must meet a minimum current college
grade point average requirement, receive a recommendation
from their commanding officer, and have significant back-
ground knowledge in computer science. The majority are
drawn from Air Force ROTC and the U.S. Air Force Academy,
with a small number of Army ROTC and U.S. Military Acad-
emy (West Point) cadets. Thus, they are undergraduates and
primarily male, between the ages of 18 and 24, and majoring in
technical disciplines. The military training in their backgrounds
instills a focus on teamwork, which is explicitly identified as a
part of the “Excellence in All We Do” Air Force Core
Value [20]. They are also familiar with the Department of
Defense Cyber Strategy [21], which calls for the use of team
competitions to “identify the most capable DoD military and
civilian cyber specialists.” Finally, the cadets receive evalua-
tions of their ACE performance, which are used as discrimina-
tors in their military performance reports. Thus, they are
motivated to perform well.
B. Learning Outcomes
The ACE program covers a broad range of cyber concepts.
Many of the program’s formal LOs coincide with outcomes
found in the ACM/IEEE Computer Science Curriculum 2013
(CS2013) report [22]. Some of those ACE outcomes with which
previous program participants have struggled have been adopted
as outcomes for the CSO intervention. They are listed in Table I,
which also relates them to their corresponding CS2013 knowl-
edge areas, LOs, and levels ofmastery. The CS2013 Information
Assurance and Security (IAS) knowledge area and the Network-
ing and Communication (NC) knowledge area pertain most rele-
vantly to CSO. CS2013 defines the Familiarity level of mastery
as “the student understands what a concept is or what it means,”
and the Usage level as “the student is able to use or apply a con-
cept in a concrete way.”
They are specific enough to be evaluated quantitatively
using a pre/posttest and qualitatively using a participant
questionnaire.
The CS2013 Familiarity level of mastery corresponds
closely to the knowledge and comprehension levels of the cog-
nitive domain of Bloom’s taxonomy [24], while the CS2013
Usage level corresponds closely to Bloom’s application and
analysis levels. In order to successfully complete the game,
CSO requires participants to complete a variety of tasks relat-
ing to the LOs, sequenced to require learning at successively
higher levels of Bloom’s taxonomy (see Table III). These
tasks also span the range of network abstraction layers: con-
nect to wireless access points, use packet monitors to read
blocks of raw bytes from a network stream, decrypt network
messages, reverse engineer network protocols, and craft and
transmit well-formed packets containing semantically relevant
data to exploit the aforementioned network protocols.
TABLE I
CSO FORMAL LOS AND THEIR CORRESPONDENCE TO CS2013 LOS
TABLE II
CSO IMPLEMENTATION OF TCP/IP SUITE LAYERS
TABLE III
BLOOM’S TAXONOMY OF CSO LEARNING ACTIVITIES
(SEE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR COMPLETE TEST)
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Furthermore, CSO includes activities that go beyond the for-
mal outcomes to at least Bloom’s synthesis level, and arguably to
the evaluation level, as well as activities directed toward the
affective domain such as fostering teamwork and establishing a
collaborative learning environment. Finally, the specific tools
chosen for use in CSO have widespread real-world application.
All text with which students interact is represented using the
American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII)
code, which together with its superset Unicode is employed by
essentially all real-world applications. All network protocols
used in the game are based on the user datagram protocol (UDP),
which underpins all real-world streaming services (audio, video,
etc.). The primary software tools available to the students (e.g.,
Wireshark, Boost C++ libraries) are commonly employed as
real-world packet inspection and construction tools.
C. Decide Game Usage
The first week of the ACE program presents a general intro-
duction to computer networking, followed by an overview of
cyber attack and network defense. These topics help set the gen-
eral cyber-landscape in which the students are immersed, but do
not directly cover the LOs of the CSO intervention. CSO is
played during the second week of the course. The intervention is
monitored by two instructors and consists of a preparation phase
(pretest and pregame briefing/lecture), execution phase (game-
play), and after-action review phase (debriefing/discussion and
posttest) [8]. In years 2016–2018, the pretest was given before
the briefing/lecture. This potentially leads to ambiguity in what
facilitated learning. In 2019, this was changed to first give the
briefing/lecture. Subsequently, we administered the pretest, fol-
lowed by gameplay, and concluded with the posttest. In this lat-
ter scenario, the only activity between the pre- and posttest was
CSO itself—removing the learning ambiguity between the
briefing/lecture and the game. The statistics presented in
Section VI-A show that learning still occurred in this revised
paradigm.
D. Design in Fun
The action of the game takes place in both the virtual and
real worlds. In the former, teams must navigate a spacecraft
(a.k.a. “ship”) to certain locations, while in the latter, they
must use real-world programming tools to perform network
operations. Success in the game hinges on coordinating
actions in the two domains, ensuring that while participants
learn from the game activities, they experience them as means
toward the end of completing game objectives.
IV. GAME
A. Overview
CSO is a puzzle-solving game in which each team uses com-
puter and network “hacking” skills as well as critical thinking to
solve a logical puzzle. Its interface ismultimodal [25], with play-
ers using a game controller to navigate the 3-D environment as
well as a variety of desktop applications and environments to
perform other game actions. A YouTube video providing more
detailed description is available [26].
B. Mechanics, Dynamics, and Aesthetics
As a game, CSO can be understood through the Mechanics,
Dynamics, and Aesthetics (MDA) model for game design [27].
Mechanics comprise the rules and bounds of player actions.
Dynamics are the elements of game flow, which can be
viewed as the player (or team) behavior emerging from the
combination of their goals and the actions possible through
the mechanics. Finally, aesthetics are the experiential ele-
ments resulting during and following gameplay.
Within this framework, C++ programming, network packet
capture, and other hacking skills are examples of mechanics, as
are game controller inputs, since they are among the fundamen-
tal actions available within the game. The dynamics of CSO are
extensive. For example, the scoring system influences game
flow by rewarding the use of mechanics in a sequence that leads
to identification of the spy. In particular, repetitive behaviors
yield diminishing rewards, thereby discouraging teams from
delaying progress. Overall, the dynamics of the scoring system
result in a competitive aesthetic bymotivating teams to solve the
problem faster than their competition.
Overall, CSO’s aesthetics encourage teams to get through as
many stages of the game as possible. In turn, the dynamics are
such that in order to continue making progress, teams must con-
tinue mastering new hacking skill mechanics, each of which
maps to one or more LOs. The game’s aesthetics also inherently
support the affective domain outcomes. Teams that work well
together and understand each member’s role will progress faster
than other teams. Independent of winning, players belonging to
such teams tend to enjoy the overall experience more than those
on teams that do not communicate effectively; thereby, reinforc-
ing the affective domain outcomes.
A concrete example is illustrative. Once teams have mastered
the hacking skills required to craft network packets, which
occurs early in the game, they have the ability to “hack” other
teams by injecting malicious control packets (a mechanic of the
game) that disrupt another team’s ability to progress. However,
continually doing so is intentionally designed to be a failing
strategy. Specifically, teams receive a modest number of points
for their first hack and decreasing rewards thereafter. This results
in the dynamic that it is only advantageous to hack the lead team,
and to do so only a few times at most. This, in turn, results in the
aesthetic of a race, in which each team is primarily focused on
completing the puzzle rather than interfering with other teams.
Scott [28] extended the MDA model to include the player
culture, which may influence both the dynamics and the aes-
thetics. Since the audience of CSO has been military cadets,
who are acclimated and receptive to friendly competitive set-
tings, the scoring system is familiar. Cadets are also trained in
a culture that promotes teamwork, which is consistent with the
intended aesthetic design of the game.
C. Gameplay
The premise of CSO is that the host institution (specified in
the configuration file, and hereafter assumed to be AFIT) has
received intelligence that a terrorist group seeks to infiltrate
the organization. A key element of the group’s plan is the
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hijacking of a space station and use of its communication
capabilities to breach AFIT’s security. A clandestine agent
working at one of the five space stations (a.k.a. the “spy,” the
“culprit”) will execute that portion of the plan. To thwart the
plan, AFIT has engaged the services of five bounty hunter
teams to identify the spy (a.k.a. “solve the mystery”) and col-
lect enough evidence (a.k.a. “clues”) for conviction.
The game is played in a 3-D virtual world (see Figs. 1 and
2) that includes the Earth, as well as one space station and one
spacecraft for each team. Each spacecraft is initially docked at
the team’s space station. These elements are displayed within
each team’s minimal GUI, which also shows their current
progress in the game, their scores and those of the other teams,
and their ship’s distance from those of the other teams. In
addition, transparent console-like text displays appear occa-
sionally to provide contextually relevant information.
Clues are gathered by inspecting the space stations’ (simu-
lated) “private networks,” as illustrated in Fig. 3(a).
More specifically (all messages use the UDP), we have the
following.
1) The team maneuvers their spacecraft within communi-
cations range of a space station and sends a “hail” mes-
sage to the server in the form of a packet containing
their team identifier (ID) and the ID of the station they
are hailing.
2) The server acknowledges the hail with its own packet
containing an arithmetic problem in the form of ASCII
text encrypted with a simple cipher using a secret key.
3) The team eavesdrops over the local wireless network to
capture and identify the server’s acknowledgment,
determines the secret key, decrypts the ASCII text, and
solves the arithmetic problem to obtain the “station
key.” They then craft a packet containing the station
key, the team ID, and the station ID. They send this
packet to the server.
4) The server again responds with its own packet, this time
containing the “station password” in the form of ASCII
text encrypted with a simple Caesar Cipher using the
station key.
5) The team finds the server’s response, decrypts the sta-
tion password, crafts a packet containing the password
along with the team and station IDs, and sends it to the
server.
6) The server responds with a packet containing a clue
encoded in alphabetic ASCII text with a keyword sub-
stitution cipher using the station password as the key.
7) The team finds the server’s response and decrypts the
clue.
The clues form a simple logic puzzle, designed such that
each clue constrains the list of potential suspects and all clues
are necessary to constrain the list to a single suspect. Once a
team knows who the culprit is, they follow a two-step authen-
tication protocol in order to make a formal accusation [see
Fig. 3(b)]. First, the team maneuvers to the culprit’s space sta-
tion and sends a request to initiate the accusation process. The
server responds by sending a single-use randomly generated
authentication code. Finally, the team returns the code to the
server along with the name of the culprit. If they have obtained
Fig. 1. Game World. This view includes Earth, the communication ranges
(“bubbles”) of the five space stations (colored to indicate the team to which
they belong), and the background. Teams would be unlikely to be this far
from the space stations during an actual game.
Fig. 2. Client view of the Game World during gameplay. This view shows
the “dashboard” of the client’s ship, the Pacific Ocean side of the Earth, the
red ship, a space station within communication range, a distant space station’s
communication bubble, the scores, the distances to the other ships, the con-
sole, and the background.
Fig. 3. These images were used to explain the mystery solving process to the
cadets playing the game. (a) Process of collecting a clue. (b) Process of mak-
ing an accusation.
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all of the clues and their accusation is correct, then the team
completes the game objectives. If they somehow managed to
make a correct accusation without having all the clues, they
have identified but failed to convict the culprit. In this case,
they must go back and collect the missing clues in order to
have enough evidence for an actual conviction to complete
game objectives.
Finally, as mentioned previously, teams have the ability to
impede each other’s progress by “hacking” each other. Specif-
ically, a hack causes the target to lose control of one of their
spacecraft’s degrees of freedom (roll, pitch, yaw, or forward/
backward translation) for a certain length of time. This means
that the spacecraft will either fly backwards or spin around
one of its rotational axes until the hack times out. A team orig-
inates a hack against a victim team by navigating within range,
crafting a packet specifying the hacking team and the victim
team, and transmitting this packet to the server. The server
verifies that the hacking and victim teams are within range
and then implements the hack and awards points to the hack-
ing team. However, the server does not verify that the hack
was originated by the hacking team identified in the packet.
Thus, teams can legally send hacks posing as another team,
thereby circumventing the time limit. However, doing so
awards points to the impersonated team.
D. Increasing Competition
The main objective of CSO is to find and convict the culprit,
but because it is a multiplayer game (with each player being a
team of approximately three to eight people in this case), sev-
eral elements are included specifically to increase competition.
First, the story itself sets the stage by casting the players as
bounty hunters—competition with others is an inherent aspect
of any bounty hunter’s job.
The scoring system is also designed to increase competition.
Score is the tiebreaker among teams that complete the mission,
as well as among those that do not. Points are awarded primar-
ily for progress toward game objectives, with teams that com-
plete objectives earlier earning more points. For example, the
first team to hail a particular space station earns 15 points,
while the second earns 14, the third 13, and so on. Although a
single point has a small effect on the overall outcome of the
game, because all objectives are scored similarly, large point
differences between teams can accumulate over the course of
the game. This is the case even when teams eventually com-
plete the same set of objectives.
Finally, in order to prevent teams from overusing the
“hacking” feature, in addition to the scoring mechanism men-
tioned previously, once a team sends a hack, they lose the abil-
ity to do so for the same length of time as the hack’s duration.
E. Team Organization
The process of obtaining clues is complex enough to justify
distributing team responsibilities; therefore, teams are strongly
encouraged to assign each member to one of four roles. The
pilot is responsible for navigating the spacecraft through the
virtual world. As such, they are in the best position to maintain
awareness of the team’s situation, guide its strategy, and coor-
dinate their teammates’ activities. Team members performing
the second role (“packet capturers”) use Wireshark to capture
network traffic and identify those packets that are relevant to
the team’s current goals. The third role is the cryptographer.
Team members in this role decrypt the information obtained
from the captured packets through correct usage of the pro-
vided decryption utilities and then interpret the decrypted
information to their teams. The last role is to customize pro-
vided C++ software to craft and send network packets that
affect the team’s progress in the game.
With fewer than four team members, players can combine
roles. With more than four, assigning multiple team members
to capture and craft packets is most effective. Regardless, in
order to succeed, team members must use all of the skills men-
tioned in the LOs of the game, especially eavesdropping over
a network to find packets and constructing their own packets
to send. They must also coordinate with each other effectively:
the pilot must be in the right geospatial position during the
entire exchange to maintain a comm link, the packet capturers
need to know when a packet is sent to/from the server so they
can be listening to the network, someone must decrypt the
information received to semantically process the information
before packets can be sent, and the packet crafters need the
information obtained from the packet sniffers to craft the next
message in the sequence.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Game Engine
CSO is powered by the AFTRBurner game engine [29], a proj-
ect created at OhioUniversity and funded by theNational Science
Foundation Graduate K-12 program. AFTRBurner was designed
to provide a powerful yet flexible set of tools to create high-qual-
ity educational games that take advantage of an immersive 3-D
virtual world environment. The 3-Dworld supported by the game
engine includes Open-Graphics-Library-based graphics, built-in
animation capability, an advanced physics engine, and support
for event-driven gameplay. In addition, the AFTRBurner engine
has its own client–server networking architecture allowing game-
play over a network. The engine was written in platform-indepen-
dent C++ to allow for cross-platform use, and its object-oriented
design facilitates extensibility and ease of use for developers.
B. Code Structure
Like the engine, the CSO game itself is written in platform-
independent object-oriented C++ (see Fig. 4). CMake is used for
cross-platform build configurations, and the compiled game can
easily be configured to run as either a server or a client.
The majority of the classes used in programming the game
inherit from engine classes. The game’s top-level manager
class holds graphics and data objects, sends and receives net-
work messages, collects and processes hardware input, and
renders the graphics.
Most graphics objects used are default objects included with
the engine, but new classes for the planet and the spacecraft
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have been defined in order to give them custom behavior. In
particular, the spacecraft objects are responsible for correctly
updating their own positions when called upon to do so by the
manager class. Among the default objects used were two-
dimensional (2-D) text boxes that formed a dynamic on-screen
console-like display to show game messages. All warnings
and informational messages for the players were printed using
the on-screen console.
C. Network Components
Game state data are managed using a client–server architec-
ture, with copies of the same executable acting as server and
client depending on their configuration files. Each team is rep-
resented as one client represented as a spacecraft that authori-
tatively owns its pose data (position and orientation). The
server owns the authoritative copy of all other game state
data, sending elements of it to the clients as necessary. For
example, the server simulates the internal networks of the
space stations. Because the clients and server have identically
structured versions of all game state data, maintaining the
game state requires only minimal network traffic.
The bulk of that traffic consists of spacecraft pose data,
which is generated as follows. Event handlers in each client
process joystick input values to calculate the associated ship’s
translational and angular velocity, yielding the ship’s pose
(position and orientation). Sixty times per second, each client
transmits its pose to the server. With the same frequency, the
server broadcasts all ship pose data to the clients, which
update their copies of the other ships’ poses.
In addition to its pose, the “Team State” for each spacecraft
includes a Boolean variable for each degree of freedom, owned
by the server. When one of these is true, the joystick event han-
dler overrides the input for the associated degree of freedom
and instead uses a predetermined constant as the corresponding
velocity component. For example, if the Team State variable
controlling forward thrust is set to true, the spacecraft moves
backward at a constant velocity regardless of the joystick input.
Once per second, the server broadcasts the Team State data, as
well as all team scores and additional Boolean values describ-
ing the teams’ progress. Clients then update their copies of their
own Team State Boolean values, as well as their leaderboards
and their on-screen summaries of team progress.
The various updates just described are implemented using
the Net Message class provided by the game engine. In fact,
all game messages inherit from the Net Message class. The
content of a Net Message is contained entirely within the data
payload of a typical network packet, and the engine automati-
cally wraps it with the appropriate headers when it is sent. As
such, a Net Message is reusable in the sense that the engine
can wrap it and send it to one destination (IP address and
port), then wrap it again and send it to a second destination. In
CSO, all packets are UDP datagrams.
The Net Message format is simple and, in particular,
includes an integer header ID in the data payload specifying
the type of game message. This enables the game engine to
polymorphically send messages and process those it receives.
In addition, the mapping of Net Message subclass to header
ID is the only information required for a third-party (i.e., nei-
ther a client nor the server) to both interpret captured game
packets and craft valid packets. Conveniently, for the players,
the mapping is displayed in the console window of every run-
ning instance of CSO. Once they discover this, they are able
to gain additional awareness of the game state by capturing
and interpreting packets, as well as to achieve a tremendous
variety of effects (e.g., spoofing a spacecraft’s location) by
crafting and sending their own packets.
The ability for third parties to intervene in the game’s inter-
nal network is an essential aspect of CSO. It is the mechanism
by which the game integrates the real and virtual worlds,
thereby relating directly to its LOs. As such, other than
maneuvering spacecraft and hailing space stations, progress is
impossible without learning how to capture, interpret, craft,
and send packets. First, each piece of information needed to
proceed to the next step can be obtained only by capturing and
interpreting network packets. For example, when the server
responds to a hail on behalf of a station, the client’s GUI dis-
plays a message that the station sent a cipher, but does not dis-
play the cipher. Similar statements apply to passwords and
clues. Next, progress at the more advanced stages of the game
requires teams to identify packets sent to IP addresses other
than their own, since the server sends station passwords and
clues to the client color corresponding to the station’s color.
Furthermore, teams must learn to identify packets based on
their transmission times, since each authentication key is inva-
lidated when another one is requested by the same client.
Finally, packets containing the answer to a station cipher, the
decrypted station password, the beginning of an accusation,
and the final accusation must all be crafted and sent manually.
Despite its complexity, a few features keep the game diffi-
culty from rising to the level of discouraging players. One
such feature is the appearance of the message header ID in
clear ASCII text in the data payload of almost every packet
that teams are meant to find. This greatly facilitates the teams’
ability to find these packets. The one exception is the
Fig. 4. Diagram showing code structure. Dotted lines show inheritance.
Solid arrows indicate input or output.
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accusation authentication key. By that point in the game,
teams have extensive practice finding packets and should have
no trouble finding it based on other criteria. Another feature
mitigating the game difficulty is the frequent on-screen feed-
back that teams receive. They are notified whenever they send
a valid packet to the server, as well as what went wrong if their
packet was not valid. For example, if one team tries to hack
another when their ships are too far apart, the server sends a
message that the hack was not accepted because they were out
of range. The on-screen feedback is initiated by the server,
which sends Net Messages that trigger the client to print their
payload strings to the console.
D. Robustness
Since the game requires teams to craft and send their own
packets to the server, both the server and the logic of the game
itself are designed to be robust against both malformed and
malicious packets. Because the hardware and software tools
provided to the players have been in widespread public use for
considerable time, it is assumed that the game is secure at the
physical, link, and network layers. Nonetheless, in case a fail-
ure occurs at one of these layers, game state is backed up to a
disk file once per second. As such, either individual clients or
the entire game can be restarted at any time with no adverse
effects.
At the transport layer, all game packet types except the ini-
tial client connection request use the UDP. Because that proto-
col is connectionless (i.e., does not require the recipient to
respond), it does not require blocking or buffering. In other
words, no combination of packets can force the server’s (or
client’s) transport layer into an unsafe state or overflow its
buffer. The tradeoff is that it is theoretically possible for a
packet to be dropped if the recipient is not ready to receive it.
Because of the relatively low number of packets required by
CSO, this has not been observed in practice. If it did, the only
consequence would be that the recipient would not respond to
the message at the application layer.
Robustness at the application layer derives mainly from the
fact that syntactically incorrect messages are simply rejected,
i.e., not passed to the game’s message handlers. As such, those
handlers need only verify the semantic correctness of the mes-
sage contents, which is not complicated. For example, many
messages specify the client claiming to be the sender, and the
server must verify that such a sender exists within the game.
This is trivial, since the client is specified using the index of
the client, which must belong to a set of consecutive integers
within a known range (typically zero to four). Other aspects of
semantic correctness are verified with the same ease.
Assuming that a message is syntactically valid, its effect
will be at the level of gameplay, and in accordance with the
educational philosophy of CSO, it is, therefore, considered a
valid game mechanic. Certainly, some such messages can be
used to accomplish effects outside of the nominal flow of the
game. In particular, because neither the server nor the clients
verify that the identity of the sender claimed in a message
matches the actual sender, it is easy for one team to spoof
another. These “vulnerabilities” are intentional. The purpose
of the game is for players to practice intercepting, interpreting,
crafting, and sending network packets, and the opportunity to
exploit these vulnerabilities encourages them to go beyond the
bare minimum in developing these skills.
Finally, gameplay also involves the social layer. The
authors have not observed any significant difficulties with the
game at this level within the context of an instructor present to
organize, explain, etc. We hypothesize that if one team was
abusing the openness of the game mechanics to make it effec-
tively impossible for other teams to play (e.g., by flooding the
server with packets), we could just ask them to stop. The
game would then resume normally.
E. Representative Creative Game Mechanics
On the most basic level, a creative player could cause C
strings to appear on their own or other team’s screen. How-
ever, teams can clear their screens of messages, so this would
not have a lasting effect on the game. It could cause the most
interference if the player sent a continuous stream of them,
keeping the opposing team from seeing messages from the
server, but the on-screen messages are not essential to game-
play, and if the opposing team really wanted to see the true
messages from the server, they could find those messages in
Wireshark.
The next simplest thing for teams to do would be to send
normal game packets as though they were a different client.
This is less likely to have an effect, since the server verifies a
client’s location every time it thinks it receives a message
from that client. Therefore, if the Red team pretends to be the
Yellow team in an attempt to hack the Blue team, it will fail
unless the Yellow team happens to be near the Blue team.
Similar checks are performed when a client hails a space sta-
tion, responds to a station’s cipher, or sends a station pass-
word. Even if the target team happens to be in the right
location for what the player is trying to do, the effect would
either be positive or neutral for the targeted team: if the Red
team sent a hail message pretending to be the Yellow team,
the Yellow team would get the points for it; furthermore, send-
ing incorrect answers to a cipher or sending incorrect pass-
words does not cause a team to lose points.
The accusation process could be used to cause another team
to lose points, but it would be more difficult. First, the target
team would have to be within range of the culprit’s space sta-
tion, or an authentication code would not be sent. The attacker
would then have to find the authentication code and send an
incorrect accusation to the server quickly enough that the tar-
get team would not have time to request another authentica-
tion code, thereby invalidating the one found by the attacker.
The team could also defend itself by flying out of range of the
culprit’s space station, which would cause the attacker’s false
accusation to be rejected. Furthermore, attackers could only
do this before a team makes a correct accusation; once a team
has made a correct accusation, no more accusation attempts
from them are accepted by the server. An attacker could have
a greater effect by sending so many requests for authentication
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codes that the target player is unable to find one and send a
guess before the code expires. The target team could still
defend itself by maneuvering away or using its self-destruct
button to return to its home station if it is unable to move.
An attacker could also send messages that are normally sent
by the server to a client, with varying results. The easiest thing
to do would be to craft fake ciphers, passwords, and clues to
send to the client. These have the potential to confuse a client,
but would be easy to identify, since the sender IP would not
be the server’s actual IP. Even if the attacker could spoof its
own IP address, it cannot replace the correct information sent
by the server, and it is still possible for the target team to keep
playing without much trouble.
A more insidious attacker could broadcast a malicious ver-
sion of the Team State that the server sends out once per sec-
ond. This could cause teams to be permanently hacked as well
as have incorrect information about their scores and their
progress in the game. If a team did this, it would quickly
become obvious what was going on, and there would be no
lasting effects once the attacker ceased its activity. Regardless,
it is unlikely that a team would figure out how to do this effec-
tively. The documentation does not provide the information
necessary to intentionally construct a malicious Team State,
and players do not have access to the source code. The most
difficult attack for a team to perform would be the transmis-
sion of a malicious version of the clients’ pose messages; this
would have an interesting but mostly harmless effect: players
would not be able to accurately see other spacecraft, but their
own positions would remain unaffected, since the clients
themselves own the authoritative copies of their positions.
Furthermore, this effect would only last as long as the attack
and would not cause any permanent damage.
Theoretically, it is possible for clients to spoof spacecraft
locations, either their own or that of another spacecraft, but
realistically, it would be nearly impossible during gameplay to
find valid coordinates to use for a spoofed location. Without
valid coordinates for locations one wishes to spoof, location
spoofing is useless. Even with valid coordinates, location
spoofing is difficult to get right. If a team manages to figure it
out during gameplay, they deserve whatever advantage loca-
tion spoofing can give them. The same principle applies for
the rest of the game; the difficulty involved in any creative use
of network messages is high enough that any team that figures
it out deserves whatever advantage it gives them.
F. Generating the Mystery
As discussed above, gameplay involves solving ciphers,
decrypting passwords, decrypting clues, and using the clues to
solve a mystery. Accordingly, the following information must
be assigned for each station:
1) an arithmetic expression, the value of which serves as
the key of a Caesar cipher;
2) an isogram (i.e., word without repeating letters) referred
to as the “password” and serving as the key of a key-
word substitution cipher;
3) a clue to the mystery.
Early implementations used fixed sets of ciphers, passwords,
and clues. However, this approach undermines the reusability of
the game and makes it theoretically possible for players to cheat
by obtaining access to the source code of the game. As such, all
ciphers, passwords, and clues are now generated randomly,
seeded by the current time, and encrypted by the server at ini-
tialization. The passwords are chosen at random without replace-
ment from a large library of isograms. The methods to generate
the arithmetic expressions and the clues are more complicated.
The value of each arithmetic expression is a distinct randomly
selected integer 2  a  25. For each expression, integers b and
c are selected randomly and integers x and y obtained such that
a ¼ ðx  yþ bÞ=c, the right-hand side of which is chosen to be
the expression. Specifically, both b and c are randomly selected
until a  c b is composite (with c 2 f2; 3g if a > 12 and
4  c  12 otherwise, as well as 1  jbj  10). Then, x and y
are chosen such that x  y ¼ a  c b. This process ensures that
the arithmetic involved in evaluating the expression is human
friendly.
Clues are formed by instantiating the templates shown in
Table IV. Specifically, one space station is randomly selected
to be designated as innocent and fill the blank in Clue 2. A list
of 32 names is randomly permuted and allocated as evenly as
possible to the stations with any leftover names being assigned
to the innocent station. The culprit is selected randomly from
the names assigned to the remaining stations. Observe that all
names have the same unconditional probability of being
selected, so players with previous gameplay experience do not
have advance knowledge of the culprit’s identity.
A list of individuals with the technical background to hijack a
space station is constructed consisting of the following: 1) three
names selected randomly from the innocent station; 2) the culprit;
and 3) four others selected randomly from the remaining stations.
After being randomly permuted, this list is used to fill the blank in
Clue 3.
A list of recent hires is constructed consisting of the follow-
ing: 1) two of the names previously selected from the innocent
station; 2) the culprit; and 3) three new names selected ran-
domly from the remaining stations. After being randomly per-
muted, this list is used to fill the blank in Clue 4.
TABLE IV
CLUE TEMPLATES
510 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON LEARNING TECHNOLOGIES, VOL. 13, NO. 3, JULY-SEPTEMBER 2020
The culprit and one other name selected randomly from the
same station are used to fill the blanks for that station in
Clue 5. The recent hires from the innocent station are used to
fill that station’s blanks. Two names selected randomly from
each of the other stations are used to fill the remaining blanks.
Observe that the culprit is unique in being on both the list of
individuals with the necessary technical background and the
list of recent hires without being assigned to the innocent sta-
tion. Consequently, the five clues constrain the candidate solu-
tion set of the logical puzzle to exactly one element.
Furthermore, no proper subset of the clues does so.
The clues are randomly permuted and assigned to stations.
The server encrypts the first two clues using the corresponding
keyword substitution ciphers and the last one by layered
Base64 encoding (a simple substitution cipher).
G. Experimental Freedom With the Physical Network
The networked structure of CSO requires the server tomanage
the state of the game. Since all significant game events consist of
packets sent to the server, only the server knows when these
events happen. Furthermore, clients do not know the addresses
of other clients. Only the server knows the addresses of all the
clients, so only the server is able to keep all of the clients updated
with what they need to know. It does this by storing information
about each team’s progress in the game and updating it when-
ever a significant game event happens.
Because it always knows each team’s progress, the server is
able to back the data up to a file and reload it when necessary.
This file’s name depends on the time when the server started
running and contains every team’s progress in the game along
with the data for the mystery generated. If the server crashes,
it can be restarted and loaded with a backup file to resume the
game from the point of the crash, overwriting the newly gener-
ated mystery information in favor of that which was stored in
the backup file. A summary of game information is also writ-
ten to a file once per second.
The server also has a sophisticated mechanism enabling cli-
ents to hack each other. They typically do directly, but as dis-
cussed above, the server maintains the true versions of the
Team States and sends them to the clients once per second. As
such, direct hacks are effective for no longer than one second,
and the only way to affect another client’s Team State for lon-
ger is to change the version sent by the server. This is achieved
by sending a network packet to the server indicating the hack-
ing team, the target team, and the type of hack. The server
accepts a maximum of one hack from each team every 20 s,
which is also the duration of each hack. The server continues
to maintain the true versions of the Team States, but applies
the active hacks to them before sending them to the clients.
Clients cannot hack themselves.
Each ship’s motion is handled by its client, based on joystick
inputs. Specifically, ship velocity along each direction corre-
sponding to a joystick axis is proportional to the square of a
time-averaged value of the corresponding input. This allows a
significant range of velocities while still providing precise con-
trol at low velocities. Thus, “normal physics” (e.g., Newton’s
Laws of Motion) are not used. Furthermore, there is no collision
detection, either with other ships or with the space stations.
However, spacecraft that navigate into the Earth or spend a sig-
nificant time in Earth’s atmosphere “die”—they are forcibly
returned to their starting position and are unable to move for 30 s
as a deterrent. Teams can also use a self-destruct button to
achieve the same effect, which is useful in case they navigate so
far from Earth that they cannot find their way back. Ships are
warned when getting too close to or too far from the Earth and
are prompted to hail a space station when they come in range.
H. External Elements
A number of external hardware and software components
are necessary to implement the game, most of which operate
independently of the game code. The most important of these
are the networking hardware and software, C++ development
environment, and GUI-based cryptography application.
Network communications occur over a local network. It is
wireless so that an effectively unlimited number of clients
(and associated players) can eavesdrop and inject packets. The
network itself is unencrypted to make eavesdropping easier
for the players. For the instances of the intervention offered to
date, Windows workstations have been used as the client devi-
ces. Because implementation of monitor mode can be chal-
lenging with Windows network card drivers [13], separate
machine configurations have been used for packet capture and
injection. ALFA Universal-Serial-Bus-to-WiFi network cards
have been used for those workstations that merely need to con-
nect to the wireless network, and the Riverbed AirPcap
adapter has been used in monitor mode to sniff packets. Wire-
shark has been used to filter and view packets captured via the
AirPcap adapter. For packet injection, players have been pro-
vided with a template project written in C++ that provides sev-
eral examples of how to send UDP datagrams, as well as an
example of how to send the Net Messages used in the game.
Although it is merely a convenience for the players, a cus-
tom GUI-based cryptography application facilitates the Caesar
Cipher and Keyword Substitution Cipher decryption required
by the game. The application allows the user to enter cipher-
text and a key, select an encryption type, decrypt the text, and
see the resulting plaintext. It is implemented in C# with no
external libraries and is, therefore, multiplatform.
VI. ASSESSMENT
In 2016 (n ¼ 39), 2017 (n ¼ 41), 2018 (n ¼ 43), and 2019
(n ¼ 44), ACE participants experienced the CSO intervention
(pregame briefing, reference materials, pregame orientation
period, and gameplay) as part of a 4-h laboratory. This section
describes the assessment of the cadets’ achievement of the for-
mal LOs identified above by presenting the methodology, quan-
titative and qualitative observations, and interpretations thereof.
A. Methodology
The same instructor conducted the laboratory all four years.
Cadets were first assigned random identification numbers to
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enable correlation of their responses on the various instru-
ments while still protecting their privacy. They were then
given a pretest (see Supplementary Material) as well as a
30-min instructional presentation (“pregame briefing”) com-
prising each team’s objectives, how to navigate the virtual
world, how to launch the requisite tools, and how to begin
inspecting data packets sent across the wireless network. In
the first three offerings, the pretest preceded the pregame
briefing. In 2019, that order was reversed.
Next, the cadets were randomly assigned to one of five teams:
Red, Yellow, Green, Blue, or Cyan. The cadets on each team
negotiated amongst themselves to assign individual roles. Once
the teams were formed, they received the game’s required soft-
ware, hardware, and documentation. The latter included a four-
page reference guide summarizing the game story and mechan-
ics (e.g., how to pilot the spacecraft, the processes of obtaining
clues and making accusations), offeringWireshark filter sugges-
tions, and specifying the network protocols and payload struc-
tures for the game’s data packets. Both the pregame briefing and
the reference guide consist of content at the knowledge and com-
prehension levels of Bloom’s taxonomy. For example, the guide
discusses which software options must be selected to attach to
the wireless network and how to use the joysticks to navigate the
spacecraft. Teams were then given 30 min to orient themselves
(e.g., by reviewing documentation, exploring software, and
learning to maneuver their spacecraft) followed by a single ses-
sion of CSO lasting 2 h.
Cadets were not given access to the source code for the
game itself.
During the game, five overhead projectors duplicated the
teams’ primary monitors, so that both instructors and other
teams were able to observe their movements within the game
environment, their scores, and their status messages. The
instructor periodically switched between observing each of
the five groups and was available for questions, but only inter-
acted upon student request.
Intergroup communication was subjectively qualified—
each team member used their own computer to gather infor-
mation specific to their task. Without sharing this information
or consuming additional information from their teammates,
forward game progress would be impossible. Similarly, in this
setup, no single student could perform all tasks necessary to
“carry” her team by herself, because no single role has the
ability to collect, process, and interpret all gameplay clues.
Students were able to switch roles if they elected to do so, but
there was no mandatory reorganization. The most common
transition was from packet crafter to traffic interceptor or vice
versa.
Following the game, the cadets completed a posttest (identi-
cal to the pretest). In each offering except 2018, they then
completed a brief Likert-style questionnaire asking about their
formal education in computing and their subjective assessment
of the lesson. In 2016 and 2017, they responded to the follow-
ing statements.
S1) “The content of the lesson was relevant.”
S2) “The organization of this lesson was logical and easy to
follow.”
S3) “This lesson should continue to be taught as part of
ACE.”
In 2019, they responded to the following questions.
S1) “How fun was the lab?” (from 1=“Not fun at all” to
5=“Very fun”).
S2) “How much did this lab help me understand capturing
and analyzing computer network traffic?” (from 1=“Not
helpful at all” to 5=“Very helpful”).
S3) “How much did this lab promote team communication?”
(from 1= “No communication at all” to 5=“Significant
communication”).
S4) “How much did this lab promote teamwork?” (from
1=“No teamwork at all” to 5=“Significant teamwork”).
S5) “How much did this lab promote team problem solving?”
(from 1=“No problem solving at all” to 5=“Significant
problem solving”).
Finally, a brief group discussion took place about the
gameplay experience.
B. Results
Fig. 5 presents participant demographic data. Fig. 6 indi-
cates the number of students that answered each test question
correctly on the pretest and the number that answered cor-
rectly on the posttest. Cumulative results for all four offerings
are shown, as well as results for just the 2019 offering.
Fig. 7 depicts various order statistics of the overall pre- and
posttest score sample distributions, for both the combined results
of 2016–2018 and for 2019. No test scores qualified as outliers
by falling 1.5 times the interquartile range below the first quartile
or above the third quartile. Test scores for 2019 were tested
against both the overall statistics and those for 2019 alone.
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to evaluate the hypothe-
ses for the years 2016–2018 and 2019 that the pre and posttest
scores are drawn from the same distribution. The test for the
Fig. 5. Formal computing education by Year. Majors categorized as “CS-
Related” were: Business Information Systems, Computer and Information Sys-
tems, Computer Network Security, Computer Science, Computer Security and
Information Assurance, Cyber Defense and Information Assurance, Cyber Intel
and Security, Cybersecurity, Information Science, IT, and Management Infor-
mation Systems. Those categorized as “CEG-Related” were: Computer Engi-
neering, Computer Systems Engineering, Electrical Engineering. Other majors
were: Aerospace Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Drafting Technologies,
Mathematics, and Political Science. In 2018, one student had as dual major in
Computer Science and Computer Engineering and is counted in both sets.
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2016–2018 scores yields z ¼ 8:5837 (p < 0:00001) indicat-
ing that the posttest scores are significantly higher. The corre-
sponding test for the 2019 scores yields z ¼ 3:3191
(p ¼ 0:00045) again, indicating that the posttest scores are sig-
nificantly higher.
Similarly, Kruskal–Wallis tests are used to evaluate the
hypotheses that the 2016–2018 pretest (posttest) scores and
those from 2019 come from the same distribution. The test for
the pretest scores yields H ¼ 1:6774 (p ¼ 0:19527), indicating
that the two sets of scores are not significantly different. In con-
trast, the corresponding test for the posttest scores yields
H ¼ 9:5694 (p ¼ 0:00198), indicating that the 2019 posttest
scores are significantly lower than those from 2016–2018.
The sentiment questionnaire results are presented in Table V.
C. Discussion
Pre/posttest questions 1–11 of the pre/posttest are multiple
choice and primarily ask the student to define terms related to
networking (IP, UDP, Wireshark, IP address, hostname, sub-
net, domain name, media access control address, monitor
mode, and promiscuous mode). The game does not define any
of these terms for the students. As shown in Fig. 6, with few
exceptions, the pretest scores on these questions were rela-
tively high.
Questions 12–22 are a mixture of multiple choice and short
answer and assess the students’ ability to analyze computer net-
working data and software. Specifically, questions 12–17 require
the students to analyze a stream of bytes from a captured packet
and interpret its contents, while questions 18–22 require the stu-
dents to analyze a snippet of C++ networking code and predict
its behavior. These questions also relate more directly to the
game—students use Wireshark to capture similar packets and
then interpret them, and students use a similar code snippet to
craft and send their own packets. In years 2016–2018, the
increase in the number of students correctly answering these
questions was for the most part greater than the increase seen for
the terminology questions, indicating at least short term reten-
tion of skills learned through the intervention.
Because all relevant p-values from the Wilcoxon signed
rank tests are less than 0.0005, the test concludes that the over-
all improvements in test scores both for 2016–2018 and for
2019 are statistically significant at the 99.95% confidence
level. This is strong evidence that the cadets learned as a result
Fig. 6. (a) Total number of students correctly answering each question on the
pretest and posttest over the four offerings (2016–2019). (b) Number of stu-
dents in the 2019 offering answering correctly.
Fig. 7. Box and whisker plots for 2016–2018 and 2019 pre- and posttest
score sample distributions. Each plot indicates the sample maximum, mini-
mum, quartiles, and median. No test scores qualified as outliers.
TABLE V
STUDENT LIKERT DATA FOR THE CSO LESSON
1For 2016 and 27, the response scale ranged from 1 = Strongly Disagree to
5 = Strongly Agree.
2For 2019, the response scale varied by question.
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of the overall intervention in 2016–2018 and as a result of sim-
ply playing the game in 2019.
In addition, the conclusion from the Kruskal–Wallis test
that the posttest scores for 2019 were significantly lower than
those for 2016-2018 is statistically significant at the 99.5%
confidence level. This is strong evidence that administering
the pretest after the prebriefing is correlated with less effective
learning. Although we are not prepared to conclude that this is
a causal relationship, it does suggest the possibility that
administering the pretest before the prebriefing primes the stu-
dents so that they retain more of the content.
On the sentiment questionnaire for years 2016 and 2017,
over 90% of students in each year responded either “Agree”
or “Strongly Agree” for all three questions (see Table V). This
is evidence of relevance, engagement, and enjoyment. More
direct evidence of enjoyment is provided by the fact that 92%
of 2019 students responded either 4 or 5 to Q1. Similarly, for
relevance and engagement, at least 92% of students responded
either 4 or 5 to questions Q2–Q5.
Based on qualitative observations during gameplay, the
greatest determining factor of team success (in terms of com-
pleting or winning the game) is the ability of team members to
communicate with each other to solve a problem. Progressing
in the game requires coordinating many tasks, each of which
can have its own substantial learning curve. For example, the
2016 Red team, which both scored the highest and was the
only team to complete all game objectives, communicated
well with each other. In addition, individual team members
were quick to figure out what to do and how to do it. This par-
ticularly displayed itself with hacking, which is not essential
for completing the game, but increases ranking both by earn-
ing points and by hindering other team’s ability to earn points.
The 2016 Red team showed initiative and enthusiasm by per-
forming multiple hacks early in the game. In contrast, the
2016 Yellow team did not communicate well with each other
at all, and they were the only team that did not find at least
one clue. The three other teams took longer to figure things
out, but were able to communicate reasonably well, as evi-
denced both by observation during the game and by the fact
that they earned two or three clues each. Similar observations
hold true for the 2017–2019 teams as well.
Perhaps most importantly from the cadets’ perspective,
however, everyone has seemed to enjoy the game. The virtual
world has a strong visual appeal; during setup, teams play
around with their joystick controllers and have fun moving
around and seeing the results on other teams’ projectors. The
game has been difficult enough to engage all cadets, but not
difficult enough to make them give up; all teams have contin-
ued to work at the game until the very end of the time avail-
able, and only the 2016 Yellow team lost hope of success. The
2016 Red team enjoyed themselves so much that they took a
group photo afterwards.
VII. CONCLUSION
CSO is intended to give students practical experience with
computer networks in a fun and engaging way. Four years of
results from the ACE program intervention indicate that it does
so. During the lesson when the game has been played, the stu-
dents all appear to be motivated and focused on succeeding, and
most have commented afterward that they enjoyed playing.
Beginningwith 2019, we first gave the pregame lecture followed
by a pretest, playing the game, and a posttest. This minor restruc-
ture ensured that results on the posttest did not include learning
from the pregame lecture. However, there is also some reason to
believe that this change reduced the overall effectiveness of the
intervention. Additionally, in 2019, we also began to formally
collect additional sentiment data to measure perception of
related aspects of the game, such as teamwork, communication,
problem solving, and enjoyment.
Furthermore, quantitative analysis of the data collected
indicates that the intervention is effective as a teaching tool.
Overall, there was a statistically significant increase in scores
from the pretest to the posttest. In addition, a question-by-
question analysis shows a greater improvement on the applica-
tion level questions than on the knowledge and comprehension
level questions, indicating an increase in practical knowledge
(see Fig. 6).
Our current results do not assess the participants’ transfer of
learning to situations outside the CSO lesson. Doing someaning-
fully within the three-week ACE program would be difficult at
best. However, we intend to release the CSO game and all
accompanying materials involved in the intervention for use by
other educational institutions. Researchers adopting it for use in
a more traditional setting would be able to assess the learning
that persists over the duration of a full academic term.
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